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CASES NOTED
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SCOPE OF HIGHWAY EASEMENT
EXTENDED BY USE OF POLICE POWER TO INCLUDE
UNDERGROUND PARKING
Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the defendant, a municipal corporation.
from erecting, leasing and operating an automobile parking garage under
street surface of boulevard adjoining plaintiff's realty. Plaintiff contended
it was not a proper highway use I and therefore beyond the use contemplated
in the original grant to the municipality, i.e., an additional servitude. From
an adverse decree the City of Detroit appeals. Held, use of subsurface for
parking was a proper highway use. Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 38 N. W.2d
625 (Mich. 1949).
The principle is established that the owner of the land over which a
highway is laid does not lose all his rights in the remainder of the fee 2
However, these rights may decrease as the public needs grow, but at all
times he retains all the rights that are not taken for public purposes by the
exercise of the police power.3 For example, he may use the subsurface to build
a tunnel or basement, 4 nevertheless he is bound to withdraw from the oc-
cupation of the street below the surface, whenever the public requires such
space for the purpose of travel.,'
Actually it may be said that the owner of land subject to a highway
easement has only three absolute rights: first, to be unobstructed in the
reasonable use and enjoyment of his property; second, not to have injury
inflicted upon his light and air; and third, to have convenient ingress and
egress. Any other use of the easement which promotes the purpose for which
highways are constructed gives him no cause for complaint.0
The owner may not validly contend that an easement acquired for
highway purposes is limited to the particular methods in use at the time the
easement was acquired, for such an easement includes all new methods which
may thereafter be discovered in the aid of travel. In addition, it has been
held that an extension of such uses to purposes, municipal in nature, but not
connected directly with the right of passage, does not impose an undue burden
1. Richards v. Citizens Water Supply Co., 140 App. Div. 206, 125 N. Y. Supp.
116, 119 (2d Dep't 1910) (a "street use" is one which is connected with the right of
passage, and tends in some way to preserve or make more secure and easy its exercise).
2. Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1938).
3. Allen v. City of Boston, 159 Mass. 324, 34 N. E. 519 (1893).
4. Breinig v. County of Allegheny, supra.
5. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34, 103 N. E. 768
(1913).
6. McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 67, 4 P.2d 139 (1931).
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on the land.7 Thus water pipes,8 oil pipes,0 subways'0 and traffic tunnels"
placed under the highway have been held to be a proper highway use and
not an unwarranted extension of the highway easement.
The court in the instant case has once more extended the use to which
an easement tor highway purposes may be subjected. This was accomplished
by holding that it is within the police power 12 of a municipality to include
underground parking, which though not travel, is an aid toward making
surface traffic safer. It is reasoned that the use of the subsurface for a parking
facility is actually not an additional servitude, but merely an additional level
for parking, which has been held to be an appropriate highway use. 13 This
addition of subsurface parking as a proper highway use is a logical and helpful
advance. Once the owner of property has been properly compensated, there
is no reason why he should be allowed to prevent the use of new aids to
transportation as our cities grow and traffic problems become more complex.
PROCEDURE-CERTIORARI-SCOPE OF REVIEW BY
SUPREME COURT
Defendant was charged with a breach of the peace in violation of a
municipal ordinance which was interpreted by the trial court, in the instruc-
tion to the jury, to have five disjunctive meanings.2 Upon a general verdict
of guilty the court passed judgment of conviction. The defendant did not take
exception to the correctness of the instruction, either in the trial court or
upon appeal in the state courts which affirmed the judgment. 3 In the petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, the defendant did
7. Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 N. W. 111 (1895);
Dalcota Central Telephone Co. v. Spink County Power Co., 42 S. D. 448, 176 N. W.
143 (1920).
8. Richards v. Citizens Water Supply Co., supra.
9. Okmulgee Producers and Manufacturers Gas Co. v. Franks, 177 Okla. 456, 60
P.2d 771 (1936).
10. Land Title Guaranty Co. of New Jersey v. Delaware River Joint Commission,
117 N. J. Law 113, 187 At. 371 (1936). Contra: Matter of Rapid Transit Railroad Com-
missioners, 197 N. Y. 81, 90 N. E. 456 (1909).
11. Hayes v. Handley, 182 Cal. 273, 187 Pac. 952 (1920).
12. White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 263 et seq., 134 Atl. 409 (1926) (all property
is held in subordination to right of its reasonable regulation by the government clearly
necessary to preserve health, safety or morals of the people).
13. In re Widening of Fulton Street, 248 Mich. 13, 226 N. W. 690, 691 (1929).
1. Chap. 193, IT 1(1), Revised Code of 1939, City of Chicago, Illinois: "All persons
who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturb-
ance, breach of peace or diversion tending to a breach of the peace, within the limits of
the city .... shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct . . ." (emphasis added).
2. "The misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if
it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm." Termini-
ello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 895 (1949).
3. Chicago v. Terminiello, 396 Ill. 41, 71 N. E.2d 2 (1947); 332 11. App. 17, 74
N. E.2d 45 (1947) ; 400 Ill. 23, 79 N. E.2d 39 (1948).
